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ABSTRACT
The concept of digital justice is intended to open up discourse
about strategies for bringing relief to those who believe they
have been discriminated against or harmed by algorithmic
decision making. Digital justice has depended on algorithmic
accountability, a means by which entities can be held
accountable for the consequences of algorithmic decision
making. This paper critically examines the concept of algo-
rithmic accountability to assess its utility as a ground for dig-
ital justice and argues that it is fraught with difﬁculties. After
discussing digital justice and algorithmic discrimination,
algorithmic accountability is decomposed into two types,
technical and sociotechnical. These approaches are critically
assessed and a cautionary note is struck about the difﬁculty
of enacting algorithmic accountability. If this argument is
persuasive, it implies that the concept of digital justice also
has difﬁculties. The paper concludes with suggestions for
moving forward that do not use either version of algorithmic
accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
Algorithms, as key components of algorithmic assemblages,
are having an increasingly signiﬁcant impact on our lives.
From activities as mundane as online searching, using GPS
directions, and seeking online recommendation to those as
complex as making loan decisions, hiring, and making parole
decisions, algorithmically mediated interactions are shaping
our social and work lives in ways that are just beginning to
come into focus. As Martin (2018, p. 1) explains, “[a]lgo-
rithms can determine whether someone is hired, promoted,
offered a loan, or provided housing as well as determine
which political ads and news articles consumers see.” Stri-
phas (2015, p. 395) observes that “over the last 30 years or
so, human beings have been delegating the work of culture –
the sorting, classifying and hierarchizing of people, places,
objects and ideas – increasingly to computational processes.”
This has, he argues (2015, 396) led to “the enfolding of human
thought, conduct, organization and expression into the logic of
big data and large-scale computation.”Willson (2016, p. 140)
suggests that this trend is important because “the ways
algorithms are designed and implemented (and their resultant
outcomes) help to inﬂuence the ways we conduct our friend-
ships (Bucher, 2012), shape our identities (Cheney-Lippold,
2011) and navigate our lives more generally (Beer, 2009).”
Put succinctly, “[a]lgorithms are not immaterial formulae,
but practical expressions that that affect the phenomenal word
of people” (Klett, 2016, p. 112).
Scholars working in such domains as critical data studies,
legal scholarship, computer science, information science,
anthropology, and sociology have begun to grapple with the
complexities of the sociotechnical impacts of the integration
and routinization of algorithmic assemblages into social and
organizational life. Scholars critical of the potential for dis-
criminatory outcomes of algorithmically-driven decision
making in such domains as banking, insurance, college
admissions, and criminal justice have begun to advocate for
ways to hold the organizations that own and/or control algo-
rithms accountable for these outcomes. In this move toward
what some are calling “digital justice,” (Couldry, Gray, &
Gillespie, 2013; Jentile & Lawrence, 2016; Sabelli & Tallac-
chini, 2018; Taylor, 2017), the concept of algorithmic
accountability has been introduced as a key component in
the attempts to redress the problems created by reliance on
algorithmic assemblages for decision making and support.
In this paper we critically examine the concept of algorithmic
accountability to assess its utility as a ground for an approach
to digital justice. After brieﬂy describing the concepts of dig-
ital justice and algorithmic discrimination, algorithmic
accountability is decomposed into two types, technical and
sociotechnical. We provide a critical assessment of these
approaches that strikes a cautionary note about the difﬁculty
of enacting algorithmic accountability and the subsequent
consequences for possibility of digital justice for those
harmed by algorithmic decision making. The paper con-
cludes with suggestions for moving forward that do not rely
on either of these approaches.
82nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Information Science &
Technology | Melbourne, Australia | 19–23 October, 2019
Author(s) retain copyright, but ASIS&T receives an exclusive publication
license
DOI: 10.1002/pra2.00019
ASIS&T Annual Meeting 2019 237 Long Papers
DIGITAL JUSTICE
The concept of digital justice is, at the moment, variegated
according to the lens that is used to examine it; data justice
can be confrontational, distributive, or protective. In its con-
frontational form, it is a challenge to the uses of data to support
and reinforce existing power asymmetries between those who
gather and analyze the data and those who generated the data
(Barnett, Koshiyama, & Treleaven, 2017, p. 1; Diakopoulos,
2016, p. 58; Martin, 2018, p. 3; McCarthy, 2016, p. 1133;
Prins, 2018). According to this critique “data systems tend to
have a disciplinary function because theway data are collected
and structured constitutes a form of normative coercion”
(Taylor, 2017, p. 6). Digital justice can also be oriented toward
distributive uses of informationwith the goal of foregrounding
groups disenfranchised by the effects of the big data divide
(Barocas, Bradley, Honavar, & Provost, 2017, p. 3; McCar-
thy, 2016, p. 1131) that characterize the modern information
environment. Finally, it can be protective, with the goal ofmit-
igating the power of the surveillance state, which uses its abil-
ity to collect vast amounts of data about citizens (Fink, 2017,
p. 13). This approach to digital justice emphasizes “resistance
to government surveillance based on principles of social jus-
tice” (Taylor, 2017, p. 7).
One characteristic that is common to these approaches is that
digital justice is not based on a foundation of individual rights
because “data injustice increasingly tends to occur on the
collective level” (Taylor, 2017, p. 8). Big data analytics
aggregate data and generate insights about groups and popu-
lations meaning that digital justice is better seen as a struc-
tural concept that involves concern for preserving the
privacy of groups in part by enhancing their ability to control
their engagement with data and data organizations which, in
turn, extends their capacity to control their data visibility,
and their rights to non-discriminatory interactions with insti-
tutions that gather big data and make use of big data analytics.
The positive dimension of digital justice involves a drive to
develop ways to protect and enhance people’s involvement
with big data. This may involve a move toward algorithmic
regulation (Mcquillan, 2017, p. 568). The negative dimen-
sion involves developing ways to redress people’s grievances
when they believe that they have been wronged by institu-
tional algorithmically-mediated decision making. Because
the problem of algorithmic discrimination is central to
digital justice, the move to hold institutions responsible for
these actions currently relies on a concept of algorithmic
accountability.
ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION
Algorithms can be used to enhance or hinder social progress
and digital justice. The social life of algorithms is shaped in
part by a pervasive technological frame that casts them as
objective and neutral, meaning that their outputs are free from
bias (Binns, 2018, p. 546; Iliadis, 2018, p. 3). This frame is
supported by stakeholders with vested interests in preserving
the status of algorithmic assemblages as neutral because it
beneﬁts them economically, legitimates them socially, and
preserves power asymmetries. The frame masks what Martin
(2018, p. 2) describes as a false tension - “algorithms as
objective, neutral blank slates versus deterministic, autono-
mous agents;” when framed in this way, the discourse
“absolves ﬁrms of responsibility for the development or use
of algorithms” because the clean code is used in messy con-
texts with contaminated data by people who do not know
how to use them. Those using algorithmic tools respond by
claiming that the algorithms are too complex and opaque,
so their responsibility for outcomes is mitigated.
Behind the veil of objectivity, critics argue that algorithms are
value laden, have moral consequences and can reinforce or
challenge power asymmetries (Ananny & Crawford, 2018,
p. 978; Mccann, Hall, & Warin, 2018, p. 14). More speciﬁ-
cally, they can support or undermine ethical qualities of the
domain in which it is intended to operate this is due, in large
part, to the decisions made by developers as they create the
algorithms. The types of decisions that are relevant here
are those that determine the roles the end users will play in
the algorithmically-mediated decision; in simple terms, the
decision can be left to the algorithm (with no human interven-
tion), to the end users (with no algorithmic intervention), or to
some combination of both (Martin, 2018, p. 2). In making
these decisions, designers and developers are also are dele-
gating accountability in the decision-making process.
Another important type of decision made by designers and
developers is about the attributes of the data set that, in their
opinions, are critical inputs to be taken into account as the
algorithm generates its output. Two assumptions underlie
big data collection that affect the training sets used to train
algorithms. The ﬁrst is that the training set is an accurate rep-
resentation of the future populations to which the algorithm
will be applied. The second is that the sample used in the
training set is a good representation of the individuals consti-
tuting that population. However, “these assumptions are sus-
ceptible to error and bias, although that is precisely what they
are intended to negate” (Haarkens, 2018, p. 22). Some subset
of these attributes will be appropriate to the decision context
while others may not; an example is the inclusion of attributes
that are proxies for race in the algorithms used in the COM-
PAS system, which “wrongly labeled defendants as ‘future
criminals’ when they did not commit a crime at twice the rate
for black defendants as white defendants” (Martin, 2018,
p. 4). In a sense, the developers are inscribing into the algo-
rithms their assumptions about how the artifact will ﬁt into
the social context for which it is intended (Neyland,
2019, p. 32).
Just as there are legal prohibitions against discrimination by
humans, there are restrictions against discrimination by algo-
rithms (Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, & Sunstein, 2019,
p. 2). The challenge is to provide a level of proof that stands
up to legal scrutiny. They argue against opening the algorith-
mic black box because it is a “mathematical impossibility” to
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understand what an algorithm will do by reading its code; the
data it uses must be examined and the algorithm must be run
and its outcomes observed (Kleinberg et al., 2019, p. 2). This
allows an analyst to determine whether some input into the
algorithm led to a discriminatory outcome or whether there
is some other externality responsible for the observed dispar-
ity. There must be documentation of the decisions made dur-
ing the development and training process, for example, the
predictive goal used to train the algorithm affects the analysis
of the training at a and the resulting outcome. The implication
of this approach is that it is more important to regulate the
person developing the algorithm than the algorithm itself.
Kleinberg et al. (2019, p. 21) describe four types of algorith-
mic discrimination. An algorithmmay produce outcomes that
lead to disparate treatment, predicting on the basis of gender
or race. It may result in disparate impact, using a predictor
variable that disadvantages a vulnerable population. It may
use a predictor variable that is a result of prior discrimination,
such as a credit score. Finally, it may produce a result that
people ﬁnd disturbing, such as giving preferential treatment
to one gender over another; of the four, they point out that this
last type of discrimination is not covered by law.
ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
A widespread and powerful technological frame has devel-
oped about algorithms and algorithmic assemblages over
the last decade. It has taken the form of a decidedly utopian
discourse about algorithms (and, by implication, the algorith-
mic assemblages in which they are embedded) that portrays
them as objective, rational, and authoritative (Dourish,
2016; Gillespie, 2014; Lee, 2018). This technological frame
is based, in part, on the way in which algorithms are thought
of in their primary domain of origin, computer science. They
are seen as code that becomes part of a software program that,
when activated, can carry out sorting, optimizing, and priori-
tizing tasks quickly, efﬁciently, and without human interces-
sion. Given this, algorithms are typically seen by computer
scientists as tools that can be used to provide control plus
logic (Lustig & Nardi, 2015, p. 744) in software. According
to Gillespie (2014, p. 4):
More than anything, algorithms are designed to be and
prized for being functionally automatic, to act when trig-
gered without any regular human intervention or
oversight.
Despite the optimistic discourse about the power of algo-
rithms to improve lives, Rainie and Anderson (2017, p. 1)
report that “experts worry they can also put too much control
in the hands of corporations and governments, perpetuate
bias, create ﬁlter bubbles, cut choices, creativity and seren-
dipity, and could result in greater unemployment.” McCann
et al. (2018, p. 14) argue that
Although algorithms held out the promise of a more neu-
tral decision making process, in reality it is more accurate
to think of them as ‘an opinion embedded in mathematics/
Willson (2016; p.145) foreshadowed this insight, claiming
that the “combination of delegated everyday practices and
algorithmic functions within social, cultural and political sys-
tems inescapably results in biases being enacted.”Diakopou-
los (2014, p. 2) states ﬂatly that “[w]e’re living in a world
now where algorithms adjudicate more and more consequen-
tial decisions in our lives.” In the domain of search engines,
Willson (2016, p. 143) notes that “Google’s Panda, Penguin
and Hummingbird algorithms and recurrent updates are other
examples where changes are made in order to encourage
some outcomes, shift priorities: technical and social.” O’Neil
(2016, p. 12) describes the various ways that algorithmic
assemblages, in her terms “weapons of math destruction,”
reﬂect and enact the biases, prejudicial beliefs, and misunder-
standings of the people who developed them. She (2016,
p. 10) argues that these math powered applications “deﬁne
their own reality and use it to justify their results” and further,
they tend “to punish the poor and oppressed in our society,
while making the rich richer.” O’Neil (2016, p. 12) details
the negative impacts of algorithmic assemblages in higher
education admissions, online, target advertising, criminal jus-
tice, the employment application process, surveillance in the
workplace, and in the credit and insurance domains. Accord-
ing to Winter (2015, p. 132) “[i]n many cases, algorithmic
discrimination unjustly harms individuals or groups who
are already socially and economically disadvantaged.”
In general, accountability is “the duty to justify a given action
to others and be answerable for the results of that action after
it has been performed” (Leonelli, 2016, p. 1). To what extent
are the developers of algorithms responsible for the future
actions of their creations? To what extent do the organiza-
tions that employ these developers bear any responsibility
for the same? To what extent can the organizations that make
use of the algorithmic assemblages (through lease, subscrip-
tion, or purchase) be held responsible for the decisions made
based on algorithmic analysis? These are some of the ques-
tions that underlie the concern for algorithmic accountability.
As the consequences of the pervasiveness of algorithmic
assemblages in people’s work and social lives become clearer,
there have been calls to hold accountable the organizations
that own, use and/or control these algorithmic assemblages.
Such a call is clearly moving away from the utopianism of
the dominant technological frame described above. One
approach to algorithmic accountability is framed as a technical
exercise and involves looking for (Dourish, 2016, p. 6):
… new ways to make algorithmic processes visible, to
render algorithms accountable, and to ﬁnd within the algo-
rithmic process some opportunity for audit, external
review, and examination.
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Sandvig, Hamilton, Karahalios, and Langbort (2014, p. 3)
similarly argue that “public interest scrutiny of algorithms is
required [to] focus on subtle patterns of problematic behavior
and that this may not be discernable directly or via a particular
instance;” therefore, it is necessary to engage in auditing
algorithms. This type of scrutiny would focus on such factors
as uncovering the criteria that are coded into prioritization,
ranking, sorting, and classiﬁcation algorithms looking for
the extent to which they are “politicized or biased in some
consequential way;” the conditions under which algorithms
fail; and the presence of bias in the training data
(Diakopoulos, 2014, p. 9). It could also involve attempts to
reverse engineer algorithms, because “[w]e don’t necessarily
need to understand the code of the algorithm to start surmis-
ing something about how the algorithm works in practice.”
(Diakopoulos, 2014, p. 14).
Problems quickly arise with this technical exercise approach
to algorithmic accountability. For example, there is the opa-
que nature of algorithms, because if access is gained, as Sea-
ver (2017) notes, algorithms are rarely straightforward to
deconstruct. Within code, algorithms are usually woven
together with hundreds of other algorithms to create algorith-
mic systems” (Kitchin, 2017, p. 7). Clearly specialist knowl-
edge is required to unravel the mangle of code to ﬁrst ﬁnd the
relevant algorithm (Dourish, 2016, p. 6), and second, to iso-
late and extract the code that is responsible for the biased or
otherwise problematic outcome. There is also a question of
whether the extracted excerpt of code is actually responsible
for the outcome or whether the outcome requires the extracted
code acting in concert with other components of the algorith-
mic assemblage. An additional complexity that may arise if
the source of the bias or problem is thought to lie in the train-
ing set used to tune the algorithmic system. Assuming that it
would be possible to gain access to the training dataset, ﬁnd-
ing speciﬁc evidence of biased data would be a difﬁcult task.
There is also a problem of legal opacity where algorithms
have patent or trade secret protection (Barnett et al., 2017,
p. 7). Although some have proposed reverse engineering
algorithms as a strategy to work around this type of protec-
tion, the problem here is that while it might show how the
algorithm works in practice, reverse engineering results in lit-
tle more than speculation about the inner workings of the
algorithm (Kitchin, 2017, p. 11), making the attribution of
accountability difﬁcult. Algorithmic audits are another pro-
posed method of determining accountability. The question
here is whether this type of audit, which focuses on the foren-
sic examination of an algorithm, can generate reliable evi-
dence that bias or discrimination has taken place.
There is also a technical issue posed by the dynamic nature of
algorithms. Willson (2016; 148) explains that:
[a]lgorithms are dynamic processes designed and implemen-
ted by humans in conjunctionwith technical affordances and
within broader political, social and cultural environments
that are shaped by the continual interactions of strategies,
structures and tactics.”
What this means is that “algorithms are made and remade in
every instance of their use because every click, every query,
changes the tool incrementally.” (Gillespie, 2014, p. 7). To
make matters more challenging, this development takes place
over time, as algorithms are coded, reviewed, and tested by
teams whose composition changes over time and that do not
typically create and maintain clear documentation of the pro-
cess. Which version of the algorithm is the one for which the
organization should be held accountable? If a person is
denied a loan because of an algorithmically driven decision
and seeks to challenge the outcome, how can the precise ver-
sion of the algorithm be isolated and examined if it is chang-
ing as it is used?
Given the challenges of the technical exercise approach, an
alternative approach has been proposed (Musiani, 2013; Ney-
land, 2019). The sociotechnical approach to algorithmic
accountability recognizes that algorithmic assemblages are
embedded in complex social, cultural, and organizational
contexts where, in addition to the technical aspects of algo-
rithms, the enactment of the algorithm involves the activities
of individuals and groups. As Musiani (2013; p.3) explains,
the questions on which accountability is based should subtly
change:
By asking questions such as: who are the arbiters of algo-
rithms? Is algorithm design an assertion of authority over
more than the algorithm itself? What is the autonomy of
algorithms, if any? - it is the accountability and the respon-
sibility of algorithms as socio-technical artifacts that is
examined, that of their creators and users, and ultimately,
of the balance of power facilitated or caused by
algorithms.
At the center of this approach is the insight that there are a
number of human inﬂuences embedded into algorithms, such
as criteria choices, training data, semantics, and interpretation
(Diakopoulos, 2014, p. 9; Haarkens, 2018, p. 25; Iliadis,
2018, p. 3). Any investigation must therefore consider algo-
rithms as objects of human creation and take into account
intent, including that of any group or institutional processes
that may have inﬂuenced their design.
To assess algorithmic accountability in this approach would
involve “[i]nterviewing designers and coders, or conducting
an ethnography of a coding team” because it can provide “a
means of uncovering the story behind the production of an
algorithm and to interrogate its purpose and assumptions”
(Kitchin, 2016, p. 11). Because the team is embedded in a
complex organization, it would also be necessary to extent
the scope of this research to include relevant stakeholders
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outside of the technical team as well as a dataset of relevant
documentation related to the development of the algorithm.
However, there are a number of difﬁculties when moving
from the technical exercise to the socio-technical approach,
and when interviewing individuals and teams of coders to
assess sociotechnical algorithmic accountability. In addition
to focusing on the coding team, the sociotechnical frame
would require extensive investigation of the social and orga-
nizational context involving, for example, the analysis of rel-
evant company, advertising and marketing, and legal
documents, interviews and observations of key stakeholders
in the development, and implementation of the algorithm.
This labor and time intensive process cannot happen quickly;
Neyland (2019) conducted such an ethnography of a team
developing an algorithmically based surveillance system
and the work took 3 years. Particularly in the case of (partic-
ularly legal) attempts to hold organizations accountable for
the outcomes of their algorithmic assemblages, the time
required to collet relevant data that can serve as evidence
means that the effort has less of a chance of being useful.
RETHINKING ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
A difﬁculty with the current state of algorithmically-mediated
decision making is that according to Leonelli (2016), p. 1),
it is:
difﬁcult to determine who is responsible for what output,
and how such responsibilities relate to each other; what
‘participation’ means and which accountabilities it
involves, with regard to data ownership, donation and
sharing as well as data analysis, re-use and authorship
Barnett et al. (2017, p. 1) argue from a legal standpoint that
algorithms are likely to be treated “as artiﬁcial persons: a
legal entity that is not a human being but for certain purposes
is considered by virtue of statute to be a natural person.” The
path to accountability then seems clear, meaning that if harm
results from the actions of an algorithm, “just sue the humans
who deployed the algorithm” (Barnett et al., 2017, p. 7).
However, as Barnett goes on to argue, the reality may be
more complex - for example, if a person suffers bodily injury
as a result of a crash with an autonomous vehicle, who
(or what) should be sued? To prove discrimination, it is nec-
essary to demonstrate that the practice or requirement used in
the process was chosen because it was likely to have an
adverse effect on a person or group (Kleinberg et al., 2019,
p. 8). This is an example of disparate treatment. Disparate
impact, on the other hand, is discrimination based on an
adverse effect against a protected group. In both cases, the
person or organization charged with discrimination must jus-
tify the choices based on reasons such as “business necessity”
or other “neutral” reasons.
One approach to accountability does not focus on the internal
workings of the algorithm, thereby avoiding the problem of
opening the “black box.” In this view, attention should be
turned instead to monitoring the outcomes of algorithmic
decision making looking for instance of bias and discrimina-
tion, particularly when directed at vulnerable populations
(Shah, 2018, p. 3).When considering algorithmic discrimina-
tion, in many cases there are two distinct types of algorithms
at work; this is typically the case with prediction and selection
algorithms. The ﬁrst is the training algorithm, which analyzes
a training dataset looking for patterns and making predictions
on the basis of the choices made by the designers and devel-
opers. These choices involve the desired outcome to be pre-
dicted (hire this person) and the set of variables used to
make the prediction (previous salary, education level, rele-
vant experience). When the decision is made that the outputs
of this ﬁrst stage are within the desired parameters, the train-
ing algorithm “produces” a screening algorithm, which can
then be used on speciﬁc cases to make speciﬁc predictions.
This latter algorithm “cannot do “literally anything” – it is
mechanically the result of whatever human decisions were
made for the trainer” (Kleinberg et al., 2019, p. 16). Once
the decisions have been made about the training data and
the desired outcome, the statistical relationships among the
variables in the training dataset determine which predictors
will be used by the screener algorithm and the weights that
they will have in the analysis. Predictions are then made on
the basis of these historical data and variables. Therefore,
accountability focuses on the social and organizational con-
text of the training algorithm and the training dataset. For this
to work, the algorithms and dataset must be “ﬁxed, stored
objects that can be inspected” (Kleinberg et al., 2019, p. 17).
Martin (2018, p. 1) advocates for an approach to algorithmic
accountability that is tied to the decision; if the algorithm has
the main responsibility for making the decision, then the
developer should be held accountable. An implication of this
approach is that organizations can be held accountable for
ethical problems resulting from the operation of their algo-
rithmic assemblages, even if they are working as designed.
In the case of algorithmic assemblages designed to act auton-
omously, Martin (2018, p. 9) argues that accountability lies
with the organization that created and sold or leased the sys-
tem; in his view, the “inscrutable defense (‘It’s too compli-
cated to explain’) does not absolve a ﬁrm from
responsibility.” Since the organization and its developers
designed the algorithmic assemblage to play the major role
in the decision context, they have inserted themselves into
the context and have therefore taken on liability for the con-
sequences of their system’s operations. In this scenario, the
end users are effectively cut out of the decision making and
are simply delivering the algorithm’s output, they cannot be
held responsible for the negative consequences of the results.
The ACM (2017) has laid the groundwork for an approach to
algorithmically-mediated decision making with its statement
on algorithmic transparency and accountability. The seven
principles described in the document call on stakeholders to
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be aware of potential harms that can occur and to provide a
means by which affected groups can seek redress for harms
that do occur. They suggest that organizations using algo-
rithms should be able to explain to the affected groups how
the algorithms work and should be held responsible for the
outcomes of algorithmically-mediated decision making. Fur-
ther, it is the organization’s responsibility to provide. Clear
documentation of the training, development and testing pro-
cesses to provide an audit trail. It should be noted that, at this
time, these are only guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Despite the technological frame that portrays algorithms and
the assemblages in which they are embedded as objective,
autonomous, and efﬁcient, it has become increasingly clear
that “… algorithms are not neutral but value-laden in that
they (1) create moral consequences, (2) reinforce or undercut
ethical principles, or (3) enable or diminish stakeholder rights
and dignity.” (Martin, 2018, p. 4). As algorithmically-
mediated decision making becomes more pervasive in the
public and private sectors, the potential for discriminatory
outcomes also becomes more apparent. Barnett et al. (2017,
p. 9) point out that “the lack of redress can have severe con-
sequences affecting individuals as well as groups and whole
societies.”
Providing digital justice for people and groups who
believe they have been harmed as a consequence of
algorithmically-mediated decision making is a complex and
difﬁcult problem that is attracting the attention of scholars
and researchers in many different ﬁelds. The main approach
to digital justice has been to rely on algorithmic accountabil-
ity. As a foundation for digital justice, the concept has prom-
ise, but as currently conceived, has problems of its own.
Decomposed into technical and sociotechnical versions,
algorithmic accountability is difﬁcult to achieve. In the case
of the former, deconstructing complex and dynamic algo-
rithms, particularly when they are embedded in algorithmic
assemblages where they interact with other algorithms, is a
difﬁcult and not likely to produce anything like a smoking
gun, meaning the lines of code that provide evidence of dis-
crimination (Kleinberg et al., 2019; Seaver, 2017). In the case
of the latter, an ethnographic investigation is required that is
time-consuming and expensive; it is made more difﬁcult by
the fact that algorithmic assemblages are developed and
maintained by teams whose composition frequently shifts
so again, ﬁnding the evidence of discrimination becomes a
challenge.
Kleinberg et al. propose imposing a regime of accountability
on the developers of algorithmic assemblages whereby they
would be required to provide extensive documentation of
their design and development processes that would make
clear the decisions made when, for example, compiling the
data set for training an algorithm. In fact, they would require
that the training data set be reserved any be made available
upon legal request. Martin (2017) also calls for all approach
to algorithmic accountability the shifts the focus from the
algorithm to the decision. If an organization provides an algo-
rithm to a third party and has designed it in such a way as to
remove the third party from the decision, the organization
bears full responsibility for negative outcomes of the deci-
sion. Both of these approaches have been reinforced by the
ACM, which recently proposes principles for algorithmic
accountability and transparency.
Other approaches have also provided glimpses of ways for-
ward. For example, Ananny and Crawford (2018) decon-
struct the concept of transparency and in doing so, they
provide an extended critique of a central concept in the tech-
nical approach to algorithmic accountability. Challenging the
assumption that “observation produces insights which create
the knowledge required to govern and hold systems
accountable,” they (2018; 294) argue that transparency is
not a state of being able to see clearly, but is, in fact, a means
of control that can be harmful, can be used to obscure, and
can privilege seeing over understanding. They (2018; 983)
also make the point that the central issue is not a matter of
holding algorithms accountable - it is more an effort to ﬁgure
out how to hold algorithmic assemblages accountable which
requires “requires not just seeing inside any one component
of an assemblage but understanding how it works as a
system.”
Binns (2018) offers a different way forward, bypassing the
technical issues with accountability to move to the step
where certain stakeholders are held publicly accountable
for their actions. Drawing on political philosophy, he
argues for a concept of algorithmic accountability based
on the use of public reason, which amounts to a set of laws,
beliefs, and regulations acceptable to all of the stakeholders
involved in the decision making. The focus here is on the
decision makers using algorithmic assemblages during the
course of their work and not on the technical details of
the algorithms themselves. In what Binns (2018, p. 544)
considers the ﬁnal stage of accountability, four questions
must be asked. These revolve around the nature of an
acceptable set of justiﬁcations about which decision makers
and those affected by the decisions can agree, a means for
resolving disputed should agreement not be forthcoming,
the determinant of precedence when such disagreements
occur (meaning, for example that the decision is imposed
over the objections of the person affected by the decision),
and a means to resolve “legitimate, epistemic and ethical
standards to which algorithmic decisions are held.” Binns
(2018), p. 550) argues that
public reason could act as a constraint on algorithmic
decision-making power by ensuring that decision-makers
must be able to account for their system’s outputs accord-
ing to epistemic and normative standards which are
acceptable to all reasonable people.
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Wong (2019) also focuses on the stage of accountability that
occurs after the algorithmic assemblage has generated its
output, arguing that the determination of algorithmic fair-
ness is a political rather than a technical concern. This is
due, in part, because the (Wong 2019, p. 4) the “idea of
“fairness” in algorithmic fairness is in many ways contest-
able … [which] foregrounds the need to settle the meaning
of fairness alongside, if not prior to, the technical tasks”
involved in algorithm development. He proposes a different
framework, Accountability for Reasonableness, adapted
from decision making in health care, as a procedure for
deliberating the fairness of any algorithm. Based on the
assumption that in a liberal democracy there will always
be disagreements between reasonable people, he offers cri-
teria of publicity, relevance, revisions and appeals, and reg-
ulation as means by which algorithmic fairness can be
ascertained. The rationales and justiﬁcation for algorithmic
decision making should be publicly available (publicity)
and should make clear the reasons why the algorithmic
assemblage works the way it does and why it is the best
way to make decisions about the affected groups (rele-
vance). There should be procedures for challenging these
decisions and for dispute resolution that do not privilege
either the decision makers or the affected groups ((revisions
and appeals) that are monitored and regulated by appropri-
ate entities (regulation).
Rahwan (2018) proposes a sociotechnical means of holding
algorithms accountable based on a variation of social contact
theory applied to a concept derived from HCI, human-in-the-
loop (HITL), which is transformed into society-in-the-loop
(SITL). An example of HITL is the case where interactive
machine learning systems can speed the process of training
when there is regular feedback from human users. Rahwan
(2018, p. 7) describes more powerful applications of HITL
in algorithmic assemblages; it can
can also be a powerful tool for regulating the behavior of
AI systems … The human can identify misbehavior by
an otherwise autonomous system, and take corrective
action … The human can be involved in order to provide
an accountable entity in case the system misbehaves
To make the move from the human to society, Rahwan
(2018, p. 9) proposes SITL, which is HITL and an algorith-
mic social contract between society and algorithmic assem-
blages that resolves tradeoffs between competing values on
which assemblages can be based such as between privacy
and security or different notions of fairness and determines
who beneﬁts and who pays the costs of the decisions made.
The goal of this approach is to “to build institutions and
tools that put the society-in-the-loop of algorithmic systems,
and allows us to program, debug, and monitor the algorith-
mic social contract between humans and governance
algorithms.”
This paper has engaged in brush clearing to critically examine
the concept of algorithmic accountability as a step toward
providing a ﬁrm grounding for the concept of digital justice
by moving away from a focus on the algorithm itself. The
next steps involve a review of the range of alternatives that
have been proposed.
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